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LAw-JuRY TRIAL-VALIDITY OF THE "BLUE RmJURY-Defendants, labor union officers, were indicted for conspiracy and
· extortion. The state mo~ed for a "blue ribbon" jury.1 Defendants objected
to the "blue nobon" panel on grounds of denial of due process and equal
protection; first, because laborers and women wrre unlawfully excluded from
the panel,2 and also because "blue ribbon" juries were more inclined to convict
than common juries.8 Defendants later accepted each individual juror. Defendants were convicted and the New York appellate court affirmed.4 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, affirmed. Defendants ·failed
to show any intentional and purposeful exclusion which would be prejudicial
to them and they did not prove that a "blue ribbon" jury is a "convicting jury."
Four justices dissented. Fay v. People of the State of New York, Bove v. People
of the State of New York, (U.S. 1947) 67 S.Ct. 1613.
Jeremy Bentham's vigorous attack on the special jury in the early part of
the nineteenth century 5 has not gone unheeded. For the past t~n years the
CoNSTITUTIONAL
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1

New York Judiciary Law No. 749aa, 29 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1917)

§§ 512-516.
2 Defendants produced statistics taken from the 1 940 census and compared them
with statistics on New York jury panels in 1945. These statistics are set out in notes
14 at page 1620 and 15 at page 1621 of the principal case.
8 THE FouRTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JumcIJ\L CoUNCIL OF THE STATE oF
NEW YoRK 47 (1938) shows that in 1933 and 1934 special juries convicted in 83
and 82 per cent of certain homicide cases, whereas common juries, in similar cases,
convicted in 43 and 37 per cent, respectively. Defendants relied on these statistics.
4 270 App. Div. 261, 59 N.Y.S. (2d) 127 (1945); 296 N.Y. 510, 68 N.E.
(2d) 453 (1946)~
.
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G BENTHAM, THE ELEMENTS OF THE ART OF PACKING SPECIAL JURIES (1821.).
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RECENT DECISIONS

New York Judicial Council has urged the repeal of the special jury's modern
counterpart, the "blue ribbon" jury.6 The "blue ribbon" jury has now emerged
victorious, but somewhat enfeebled, from its most recent encounter in the highest
court of the land.7 Although it normally never allows a person to complain of
exclusion from jury service where he is not a member of the excluded class,8
the Court in the principal case felt it unnecessary to decide whether lack of
identity with the excluded group, would, by itself, defeat an otherwise well
established case. Defendants relied primarily on exclusion cases which arose in
the lower federal courts 9 but the Court distinguished those cases by noting
that the Supreme Court can exercise supervisory control over lower federal
courts, whereas, in cases such as the one at bar involving a state court, the
function of the Court is "to protect the integrity of the trial process by whatever method the state may see fit to employ." 10 While the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the accused a fair trial 11 before an unbiased tribunal,12 it has
been held that the right to a trial by jury is not inherent in due process of law.18
If trial by jury is used the defendant is entitled to nothing more than a neutral
jury.14 Congress has specifically condemned exclusion from jury service on
racial grounds,1 5 but where there is no such specific condemnation, the burden
is on the defendant to prove clearly that the procedure is so far afield in his
own case that it results in a denial of due process or equal protection.15 Even
in cases under the statute 17 a mere showing that the class is not represented is
insufficient 18 but there must be a showing that the absence was due to discrimination.19 Defendant's· contentions of economic discrimination were rejected
6 See THIRTEENTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CouNcIL OF THE STATE

NEW YoRK 53 (1947) and earlier reports cited therein.
7
The Newj York special jury had previously been upheld in Hall v. Johnson,
186 U.S. 480, 2z S. Ct. 943 (1901), although the case may have been disposed of
on procedural grounds, rather than on the constitutionality of the jury. Cf. Brown
v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 17z, zo S. Ct. 77 (1899), wherein the New Jersey provision for a "struck jury'' was held constitutional.
8
Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); Rawlins v. Georgia, z.01 U,S.
638, 26 S. Ct. 560 (1906).
9
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62, S. Ct. 457 (1942); Thiel v.
Southern Pacific, 3z8 U.S. 217, 66 S. Ct. 984 (1946); Ballard v. United States,
329 U. S. 187, 67 S. Ct. 261 (1946). See also 45 M1cH. L. REV. 216 (1946).
10
Principal case at 1630.
11
Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 43 S. Ct. 265 (1923); Mooney v. Holahan,
294 U.S. 103, 55 S. Ct. 340 (1935); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 S.
Ct. 149 (1937); Buchalter v. New York, 319 U.S. 427, 6iS. Ct. II29 (1943);
DeMeerleer v. People of the State of Michigan, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 596.
12
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U. S. 510, 47 S. Ct. 437 (1927).
18
Palko v. •Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 58 S. Ct. 149 (1937) and cases cited
therein. But see Adamson v. California, (U.S. 1947) 67 S. Ct. 1672..
14
Principal case at 1628.
15
Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. L. 336; 8 U.S.C. (1940) 44.
16
Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 65 S. Ct. 1276 (1945) and cases cited therein.
17 Note 15, supra.
18
Virginia v. Rives, IOO U.S. 313 (1879); Akins 1v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 65
S. Ct. 1276 (1945) and cases cited therein.
19 lbid.
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because of differences in classi:6.c:i.tions used and a discrepancy of :five years in
the statistics presented. It was also felt that New York requirements of citizenship and literacy would naturally tend to disqualify a higher percentage of
manual laborers than other groups, and even if there were excessive exclusion,
defendants had not shown that it was prejudicial. Women are not required
by New York law to serve on juries 20 and it was therefore natural that women
were not proportionately represented and that "civic conscious" women serve
more frequently than women from other groups. In addition to this, a state
may lawfully exclude women from jury service.21 Defendants' most important
- contention was that "blue ribbon" juries are "convicting juries." Mr. Justice
Jackson stated that defendants would have had grounds for complaining of
unequal protection of the laws had they shown that the disparity of convictions
in 1933-34 22 had continued until the present time, even though there had
been no unwarranted convictions. The fact that the majority sustained the
convictions because defendants had failed to carry the burden of proof added
to the fact that four justices dissented in this case, makes it appear that the
"blue ribbon" jury might easily fail to survive another test in the Supreme
Court. However, the Judicial Council of the State of New York continues to
press for abolition of the "blue ribbon"- jury and it is not improbable that the
New York legislature may abolish it before another case reaches the Supreme
Court.

Edward S. Tripp, S.Ed.

New York Judiciary Law No. 599·
The court notes in note 31 at p. 1628 of the principal case, that seventeen
states do not permit women to serve on juries.
22 Note 3, supra.
20

21

